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Confusingly, the seminal contributions on the “one share, one vote” (1S1V) issue—Grossman
and Hart (GH, 1988) and Harris and Raviv (HR, 1989)—are quoted as evidence by both
proponents and opponents of 1S1V. In fact, GH-HR stress the cases where the rule is optimal,
but do acknowledge possible deviations from the optimality of 1S1V (without developing these
cases). In light of renewed interest in the relation between shareholder protection and control
arrangements, we ﬁrst thoroughly review the optimality of 1S1V in the original setting, without
the complication of structural enhancements except that both incumbent and rival management
can have private beneﬁts simultaneously. After this analysis of the perfect-foresight optimal
charter we also consider the imperfect-foresight problem where the entrepreneur-founder only
knows the distribution from which the rival will be drawn. The issue is what set of rules the
entrepreneur will put in place, re take-overs, so as to maximize the IPO value of the ﬁrm. We
ﬁnd that, from the founder’s perspective, 1S1V is never optimal with imperfect foresight, and
optimality is surprisingly rare even with perfect foresight. We also explain why governments
rarely step in: from simulations we ﬁnd that the social impact of the charter choice seems to
be far smaller than the private impact (on IPO value or post-take-over value). Lastly, we go
beyond the dual-class case, explaining the role and usefulness of multiple-class structures.
Keywords: Corporate Control, Security Design, Takeovers.
JEL-codes: G32, G34.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares
Introduction
Google’s 2004 IPO was innovative in many ways: it relied on a Dutch auction and the amount
ﬁrst announced equaled 2,718,281,828 billion (that is, e, the Neperian base); but also, as
news.com.com writes (April 29, 2004),
In an unusual provision for a technology company, Google will create two classes of shares
with diﬀerent voting rights [...]. Such structures have proved beneﬁcial in media companies
such as The New York Times, the ﬁling states.
The newsﬂash adds that the dual-class charter is meant to preserve control for the owners,
echoing Bebchuck’s (1999) rent-protection theory. Yet preventing take-overs needs not to
be the sole purpose of such a structure. We examine how, relative to a one-share one-vote
(1S1V) charter, a dual- or multiple-class voting structure interacts with majority requirements
to create extra shareholder value in case of a take-over bid, and to what extent the owner’s
optimum deviates from the social optimum.
The seminal papers in the literature on voting structure, Grossman and Hart (GH, 1988)
and Harris and Raviv (HR, 1988, 1989) derive conditions for the optimality of 1S1V. The GH-
HR papers have a rather similar set-up (which we broadly adopt in our work). Speciﬁcally,
there are two types of cash ﬂows: the security beneﬁts accruing to the security holders, and the
private beneﬁts obtained by the controlling party. A rival management team attempts to dis-
miss the incumbent managers and take control of the target ﬁrm. Incumbent and rival teams
have diﬀerent management abilities, which aﬀects the level of both the security beneﬁts and
the private beneﬁts. GH establish conditions for the optimality of 1S1V from the perspective
of an entrepreneur writing a charter. They argue that, by and large, 1S1V is optimal. They
do acknowledge exceptions, but conﬁne that particular part of their analysis to an example,
arguing that these exceptions should be rare and insigniﬁcant. HR(1988), in a similar set-up,
ﬁnd that a simple majority rule in combination with 1S1V are the socially optimal structure.
However, an entrepreneur in their model, if allowed, would prefer to issue two extreme secu-
rities, one with pure votes and one with only cash ﬂow rights. In a more general version ofDouble Bids for Dual-Class Shares 2
their ﬁrst paper, HR(1989) stress that an entrepreneur would optimally issue a single voting
security, and that this ”generalizes the results of GH(1988) and HR(1988) who proved the
optimality of one-share one-vote ...”
The focus of the above papers and the claim of one-share one-vote being an optimal struc-
ture overall, ﬁt in a context. First, the papers were written at a time a policy debate was
in full swing as to whether the 1S1V structure had to be a requirement for listing on a US
stock exchange. The research question in GH and HR is therefore rather normative, focused
on whether exceptions on 1S1V should be allowed for or not, rather than on examining the
mechanics behind these deviations. Second, in the US dual-class structures are rather rare.
In Europe they are not. The Scandinavian countries as well as Switzerland and Italy, for in-
stance, have long had restricted and unrestricted stock with diﬀerent voting rights. The Dutch
have an extreme form of non-1S1V: the original shares are placed into a trust, which then
keeps the voting rights and passes on the cash rights to certiﬁcates. While the Scandinavian
and Swiss dual-share structures seem to be on the way out, the Dutch administratiekantoor
structure remains quite popular and is now even spreading to Belgium. Belgium used to have,
and Germany still has, an upper limit on the number of votes that could be eﬀectively used
by a single shareholder in the General Assembly. Volkswagen’s charter not only limits a sin-
gle shareholder’s voting rights to 20 percent, but even requires an 80 percent majority for a
take-over (and other major decisions), thus giving the largest shareholder—Niedersachsen—a
veto. A number of well publicized recent IPOs in the US also introduced dual or multiple share
classes (e.g. Google, Agere). This far from exhaustive list shows that 1S1V is not a univer-
sally accepted system. This raises the positive-economics issue as to what prompts the writers
of charters to deviate from 1S1V as predicted in GH(1988) and HR(1989) or from extreme
securities as in HR(1988), and the shareholders and regulators to accept changes away from
1S1V.
Dual-class security structures have been studied before.1 Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1992)
analyze why diﬀerences occur in take-over bids on shares which diﬀer in voting rights. The
authors therefore develop a framework that introduces blockholders and restrict private beneﬁts
to pure synergy gains, therefore focusing on extra rents for the bidding ﬁrm only. Their analysis
based on Swedish data shows that a blockholder prefers dual class structures, even if 1S1V
1An interesting survey of the ﬁeld (and related corporate governance issues) is provided by Becht, Bolton
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maximizes the value of the ﬁrm. The rival’s bid prices are equal when no blockholders are
present, otherwise bids are diﬀerentiated. Taylor and Whittred (1998) examine the use of
dual class stock in the Australian IPO market and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with dual class shares are
comparatively small and their ﬁrm value positively related to the human capital of the founding
shareholders, rather than to assets-in-place. And in an attempt to measure private beneﬁts
of control in the Italian market, Zingales (1994) ﬁnds that voting shares carry a premium of
up to 82% compared to nonvoting shares. Using data from the same market, Nicodano (1998)
examines the relationship between group structures and the voting premia on dual class shares.
And, as mentioned, Grossman and Hart (1988) oﬀer some numerical examples of cases where
1S1V does less well. Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989) discuss the diﬀerence between a rival
bidding for the shares cum voting rights or for just the pure voting rights. Capital gains taxes,
they show, would make the second option more attractive. Another theoretical justiﬁcation
of deviations of 1S1V is based on the behavior of large blockholders or on poor shareholder
protection (e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999 and Faccio and Lang, 2002),
or focuses on post-takeover moral-hazard problems. In this last category, Burkart, Gromb
and Panuzzi (1998), for instance, ﬁnd that one-share one-vote is not necessarily optimal, even
from a social point of view. Finally, the issue is the subject of discussion in circles seeking
to harmonize take-over rules in the EU. Some parties, arguing violations of 1S1V disrespect
a basic inequality principle, call for limits on the power of high voting shares in so-called
”break-away” rules based on a ”proportionality principle” (for an overview see eg. Bechmann
and Raaballe, 2003). Other academics (eg. Bebchuk and Hart, 2002) refute these attempts
by simply arguing that ﬁrms could easily circumvent such regulation by setting up pyramid
structures. Furthermore, buyers of high voting stock would have already paid a premium for
superior voting securities at the time of purchase; by a change of the rules, they would see
their acquired rights violated.
In light of this renewed interest, and keeping in mind the widespread violations of 1S1V
in reality, we ﬁnd it useful to thoroughly evaluate the optimality of one-share one-vote within
the basic GH-HR setting, without the complication of big structural modiﬁcations. So we
base our analysis in general on GH(1988) and HR(1989). Deviations between our and their
work have to do with the objectives of the study and with two restrictions that are relaxed.
Whereas the motivation of GH-HR is normative—to prove or disprove the optimality of 1S1V
issue from the viewpoint of the entrepreneur at the design stage—our aim is positive: we
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voting structures. The modiﬁed assumptions are threefold (neither of them touching on the
basic structure). First, GH-HR essentially consider cases where only one of the contestants can
extract private beneﬁts, either the incumbent or the rival. However, if one team can extract
some rents, why would another one in the same position not be able to do so—especially
as even GH-HR seem to be in two minds as to at which side the private beneﬁts are most
likely? Second, by splitting the original design problem in several scenarios according to
the characteristics of the rival and incumbent management teams and by omitting the above
scenario with potential control perks for both the rival and the incumbent management teams,
GH-HR implicitly assume that the rival’s abilities to generate and divert cash are known at
the time the charter was written or last revised. One could argue, however, that at that time
the rival’s cash-generating abilities are usually known only in a probabilistic sense. Thus, the
question arises as to how an entrepreneur with realistically imperfect foresight should assign
the voting rights and determine the majority rules, having in mind a distribution rather than
an individual realization. The third modiﬁcation is technical: in line with the post-GHHR
literature we consider just conditional bids. The reason is that the GH-HR unconditional bids
create a problem with the existence of equilibrium (see e.g. Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988).
We ﬁnd that, by focusing on special cases and excluding the case where both contenders
can derive private beneﬁts, GH-HR miss cases where dual-class structures outperform 1S1V
even with perfect foresight about the bidder’s characteristics, and therefore overstating the
optimality of 1S1V. Consistent with this, our imperfect-foresight analysis fails to produce even
a single case where 1S1V does better than the two competing dual-class charters that enter our
horse race. Thus, we have an explanation why deviations from 1S1V are far from uncommon.
But we also explain why governments rarely step in: as far as we can tell by our simulations,
the social impact of the charter choice turns out to be far smaller than the private impact
(on IPO value or post-take-over value). In passing, we also go beyond the dual-class case,
explaining the role and usefulness of multiple-class structures.
This note is structured as follows. In Section 1 we set up the model. The analysis of the
actual take-over game, given the set of rules laid down in the corporate charter, follows in
Section 2. Section 3 provides a GH-HR style perfect-foresight analysis of the optimal charter,
and Section 4 the results of the imperfect-foresight analysis. Section 5 concludes.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 5
1 Model set-up
In setting up our model we choose to closely follow the assumptions in GH. The setting is
as follows: An entrepreneur with no ﬁnancial resources has started up a ﬁrm. She appoints
a management team i, the incumbent, under whose control the ﬁrm generates security cash
ﬂows yi and private beneﬁts zi. The entrepreneur also issues multiple classes of shares with
various degrees of voting power and cash ﬂow rights. In most of the text, we limit this to a
dual-class system with class-A and class-B shares having, respectively, voting powers va and
vb = 1 − va, and cash-ﬂow rights say and sby = (1 − sa)y. The entrepreneur also sets a level
for α, the proportion of votes a team needs to assume control of the company. Lastly, she
sells all claims to atomistic, risk-neutral investors. Neither the incumbent management nor
any potential rival owns any of these securities.
The take-over issue then arises from the arrival of a rival, r, under whose management the
ﬁrm would generate a cash ﬂow yr and private beneﬁts zr. These characteristics are known
to all investors. This rival management team publicly announces its bid, taking into account
that any bid may trigger a counterbid from the incumbent, revised bids from r, and so on.
Bids are conditional oﬀers for all shares.2 After r’s ﬁnal bid (and i’s ﬁnal counterbid, if any),
investors choose to tender shares or votes to either i or r. In fact, under our full-information
assumption nothing is gained by explicitly playing a multi-stage game: r moves only if he will
succeed, and r’s ﬁrst move, if any, will be his only one. After this bidding/tendering stage, a
vote is held, and all shareholders vote. A change of control occurs when more than the fraction
α of the voters vote in favor of the change; and if α is below 1/2, the largest group of votes
determines the issue.3
Before we solve the problem for the entrepreneur regarding the voting and security struc-
ture, we consider the control contest in more detail.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 6
Table 1 Types of Charters and Types of Bidding Wars
charter bidding game
equal voting power (va = vb = 1/2)
α > va = vb • r needs both A and B to muster α of the vote
• i needs either A or B to block r
α = va = vb • r needs both A and B to avoid a tie
• i needs either A or B to block r
unequal voting power (va > 1/2 > vb)
α > va > vb • r needs both A and B to muster α of the vote
• i needs either A or B to block r
α = va > vb • A suﬃces for r to win
or va > α ≥ vb • A suﬃces for i to block r
or va > vb ≥ α • B is useless to both r and i
2 Analysis of the bidding game
Without loss of generality we assume that the A shares represent at least as many votes as the
B shares, i.e. va ≥ vb. Table 1 shows that there could be two types of bidding contests:
• the double bid: r bids for both the A and B shares (if that is needed to achieve a superma-
jority or to avoid a tie), and i can thwart r by buying either the A- or B-shares;
• the single bid: r bids for the A shares, and i can thwart r only by buying these very
A-shares.
Thus, a single bid by r for the low-voting-power B-shares cannot be rational. We start our
analysis with the bidding war for the A-shares.
2.1 The bidding war for the A shares
From the shareholder’s point of view the conditions of success for a bid on the A shares are
independent of the take-over’s impact on the B shares. The reason is that atomistic investors
treat the probability of a change of control as unaﬀected by their own decision. Thus, the
bidding game for the A shares follows the standard logic of a single-class bid without negotiation
option:
2See the introduction on the relevance of conditionality. Bids for less than all shares would require a diﬀerent
analysis. However, take-over codes typically prescribe that a change of control should lead to a bid for all
outstanding shares.
3GH assume α > 1/2 to avoid degenerate solutions. By accepting that, in such a case, the majority determines
the outcome, we do not need this assumption.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 7
Proposition 1 Under GH assumptions except that each player has potential private beneﬁts





yr + Max(zi + sa[yi − yr],0) ,if sayr + zr > sayi + zi
yi ,otherwise.
(1)
Proof The characteristics of the optimal bid prices pa if r is to win a bid for the A-shares
are:
pa,r ≥ pa,i, (2)
pa,r ≥ sayr, (3)
pa,r ≤ sayr + zr, (4)
pa,i ≥ sayi, (5)
pa,i ≤ sayi + zi. (6)
Condition (2) simply says that r outbids i. The lower bound on r’s bid price in (3) is the
free-rider bound: even if r outbids i, the shareholders will still not tender to r as long as the
oﬀer price remains below the post-bid security value of those shares. The upper bound on
r’s bid prices in (4) is r’s reservation price, beyond which r’s proﬁt turns negative: the total
amount of premia paid over and above the security value cannot rationally exceed r’s entire
private beneﬁts. The conditions on i’s oﬀer, in the last two equations, are analogous.
From this we immediately obtain the condition under which r wins this contest and the
price at which this occurs. Notably, r can (and will) win a contest for the A shares if her
reservation price exceeds that of i. That is, if there is a contest for the A-shares, r will win if
sayr + zr > sayi + zi. (7)
In Section 4, we refer to this condition as r’s success condition. Given (7), the most economical
bid that meets all constraints is to oﬀer i’s reservation price or the post-bid security value,
whichever is the highest:
pa,r = Max(sayr,sayi + zi). (8)
The value of the target company as a whole is then found by adding the post-bid value of the
B shares, (1 − sa)yr:
V A
r = Max(sayr,sayi + zi) + (1 − sa)yr.
= yr + Max(zi + sa[yi − yr],0). (9)Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 8
In contrast, if r’s success condition, (7), is not met the value of the target company stays at
yi. QED
2.2 The double-bid game
Proposition 2 Under GH assumptions except that each player has potential private beneﬁts





yr + Max(0,sa(yi − yr) + zi) + Max(0,sb(yi − yr) + zi) ,if yr + zr > yi + 2zi
yi ,otherwise.
(10)
Proof If r is to win a double-bid game, then for both the A and B shares r’s oﬀer must beat
i’s, clear the no-free-riding hurdle, and leave r some gain. This already yields ﬁve conditions,
pa,r ≥ pa,i,
pb,r ≥ pb,i, (11)
pa,r ≥ sayr,
pb,r ≥ sbyr, (12)
pa,r + pb,r ≤ yr + zr. (13)
The ﬁrst four equations are the outbidding and the no-free-riding conditions, two of each. The
ﬁfth one provides r’s reservation value for the combined bids: r’s private beneﬁts now provide
the upper bound on the total premia spent (over and above the security value) for both classes
of securities together. To succeed, r should forestall a counterbid for both the A or B shares,
taking into account the following constraints (no free riding, and no loss for i) upon i’s rational
counterbid:
bounds on pa,i: sayi ≤ pa,i ≤ sayi + zi,
bounds on pb,i: sbyi ≤ pb,i ≤ sbyi + zi. (14)
From this, the conditions under which r wins, and the corresponding prices, again follow
immediately. The rival has to make sure that i can top neither pa,r nor pb,r even when the
incumbent team would spend its entire private beneﬁts on buying one type of shares:
pa,r ≥ sayi + zi, (15)
pb,r ≥ sbyi + zi. (16)Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 9
For these bids to be possible, r’s rationally spendable resources must exceed the sum of i’s
alternative reservation prices, i.e.
yr + zr ≥ yi + 2zi. (17)
If (17) is met, r takes over the target at the lowest prices that satisfy both (15), (16), and the
free-rider bounds; that is, the value of the ﬁrm becomes
V AB
r = pa,r + pb,r
= Max(sayr,sayi + zi) + Max(sbyr,sbyi + zi)
= yr + Max(0,sa(yi − yr) + zi) + Max(0,sb(yi − yr) + zi). (18)
QED
Note, from the above, the two advantages of the incumbent over the rival. First, while
the rival needs the votes from both classes of shares to make a successful bid on the target
company, the incumbent can block this bid by focusing on only one class of shares. Second,
the rival makes the ﬁrst move, so the incumbent can aﬀord to wait and see whether a winning
counterbid is feasible and, if two counterbids are feasible, which of these is the cheaper one.
Thus, in its ﬁrst move r must prevent each of the two possible counterbids, by bidding high
for both classes. This explains why, compared to (7), to i a dollar of private beneﬁts now
provides twice as much ﬁrepower as it does to r. Still, this extra-ﬁrepower feature is relevant
only when yi is suﬃciently large relative to yr. Indeed, when yi is way below yr, the doubling
of the eﬃcacy of zi would not help at all in raising the hurdle for r. Details are provided in
Section 3.
2.3 A generalization to multiple-class structures
We saw that a double-bid dual-class charter can force a suﬃciently strong rival to fork out more
cash. In this subsection we broaden our approach and verify to what extent a multiple-class
structure could add more beneﬁts of that type. We start with three classes of shares, A, B
and C, and we assume without loss of generality that va > vb > vc. With just three classes
an exhausting classiﬁcation of all possible structures, in the style of Table 1, already becomes
rather tedious, so we conﬁne ourselves to a discussion of some illustrative cases. Our purpose
is to show that some three-class games can be reduced to the single- and double-bid games we
have already considered, while for other parameter values a triple-bid game can emerge that
may add more value.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 10
Consider, for instance, a charter with (va > vb >)vc > α. If vb + vc < va, then holding
the A-shares is enough to meet the α-hurdle without any risk of being outvoted. This leads
to the single-bid game we already analyzed, with r and i ﬁghting for the A-shares, and with a
composite security, B+C, now taking the role played by B in the dual structure we had before.
The existence of a third class is of little importance here.
Consider, next, a charter with α > va(> vb > vc) and (va+vb > va+vc >)vb+vc > α. The
rival goes for a combination of two classes (whichever pair is cheaper) to muster the required
votes and be safe from being outvoted. The incumbent can thwart r’s plan by bidding for
either of whichever pair r goes for. Thus, r must set the prices such that i can not outbid him
for either of the two, which again provides i with the doubled ﬁrepower per unit of zi like in
the double-bid games we considered in the previous section.
Consider, lastly, a charter with α > va(> vb > vc) and va +vb +vc > α > va +vb. Here, to
muster the required number of votes and be safe from being outvoted, r needs all three classes.
The incumbent, by contrast, can stop the takeover by obtaining either the A-, or the B-, or
the C-shares. Thus, r’s bid for each and every class must be such that it it cannot be beaten
by i: pa,r > sayi + zi, pb,r > sbyi + zi and pc,r > scyi + zi, implying pa,r + pb,r + pc,r > yi + 3zi
and, therefore, yr + zr > yi + 3zi . Here, the triple-bid game provides i with three times the
nominal ﬁrepower per unit of zi. Thus, provided the rival is suﬃciently rich to aﬀord this, a
triple-bid charter would improve the value of the ﬁrm.
In general, then, multiple-class share structures are a way of milking a rival that has a total
cash-generating ability (y+z) exceeding that of the incumbent; and any zi units of added total
value warrants a new class of securities and a voting structure that forces r to buy each and
every class of shares. Two caveats are in order, though. First, if yr is quite high relative to
yi, the no-free-riding bound may already be so tough that r would be paying out most of the
added value even without a double or triple bid. Second, if a triple-bid charter is installed
before the rival is known, it may spoil useful takeovers if the rival turns out to be of less than
the triple-star quality the founder hoped for.
* * *
These caveats have brought us to the main issue of the paper. The problem for the entrepreneur
is how to specify the required fraction of votes α, as well as the cash-ﬂow and voting rights
(sa and va) for the classes of equity, so as to maximize the proceeds from selling the securities
in the open market (“the value of the ﬁrm”). In the next section we again consider just twoDouble Bids for Dual-Class Shares 11
classes of shares. Starting from the conditions and payoﬀ structures for single- and double-bid
charters, we verify which of three charter does best: 1S1V, the dual-class with a single-bid
structure, or the double-bid one.
The assumption implicitly underlying GH-HR’s work is that when r show up, the founder
has ample opportunity to size him up and then design a charter that extracts the maximum
price out of him. In reality, the founder would rarely have the chance at such surgical pre-
cision. Thus, while we initially provide a GH-HR type perfect-foresight analysis (Section 3),
we then give the founder a much blunter instrument, viz. a charter that is tailored to a given
distribution but that, once set, applies to any drawing from that distribution (Section 4).
3 GH-HR perfect-foresight optimal sharing & voting structure
Starting from the conditions and payoﬀ structures for single- and dual-class bids of Section 2
we examine in what optima the formally dual structure collapses into a a virtual 1S1V. Such a
pseudo-1S1V arises when the optimal dual-class charter is a single-bid one with sa = 1. Such a
charter, if optimal, is as good as 1S1V since the votes assigned to the B-shares are, apparently,
not useful to anybody. A double-bid optimum, in contrast, can never collapse to a virtual
1S1V: even when sa = 1, the double-bid assumption is that the class-B shares are needed for
a majority, which is incompatible with 1S1V-equivalence.
3.1 Scenario 1: The incumbent provides larger security beneﬁts
Mathematically, the GH-HR perfect-foresight type analysis depends heavily on whether yi > yr
or not. In this section we consider all cases with yi > yr, in ascending order of zr. With
yi > yr, a higher sa generally increases the takeover value (see (8)), which also means that the
requirements in terms of zr become tougher.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of this paper, if yi > yr the optimal cash distribution
rule and the resulting value of the company upon arrival of the bidder are given by
if zr < zi : V = yi for any sa; (19)




≤ 1 ⇒ V A∗
r = yr + zr; (20)
if zi + (yi − yr) ≤ zr ≤ 2zi + (yi − yr) : s∗
a = 1 ⇒ V A∗
r = yi + zi; (21)
if zr > 2zi + (yi − yr) : V AB∗
r = yi + 2zi for any sa. (22)Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 12
There is no take-over in the ﬁrst case under any charter. 1S1V is optimal only in case 3. In
case 2 the single-bid dual-class charter is optimal, in case 4 the double-bid dual-class one.
Proof We discuss the cases on the basis of ascending zi:
• zr < zi. This implies that, even with sa = 0, r’s reservation price remains below i’s. There
is no bid, and the ﬁrm’s market value is yi.
• zi ≤ zr ≤ zi + (yi − yr). With these parameter values it is feasible for the entrepreneur to
trigger a bid on the A shares. For instance, with a charter stipulating sa = 0, r’s success
condition (7) for a bid on the A shares simpliﬁes to zr > zi, which is satisﬁed in the domain
currently considered. But as a higher sa improves the value of the ﬁrm, it is optimal to
increase sa until r’s success condition (7) holds as an equality: s∗
a = (zr − zi)/(yi − yr). Of
course, this makes sense only as long as (zr−zi)/(yi−yr) ≤ 1, i.e. as long as zr ≤ zi+yi−yr,
which therefore becomes the upper bound on zr for this type of solution. In short, in this
domain we get a rent-extracting solution,




≤ 1 ⇒ V A∗
r = yr + zr. (23)
The last result follows from plugging the optimal sa into (9).
• zi +(yi −yr) ≤ zr ≤ 2zi +(yi −yr). The bounds on this fourth zr domain are, respectively,
the value where the s∗
a of the previous domain hits the bound s∗
a ≤ 1, and the value that
makes a double-bid takeover more attractive to r, as we shall see. Here, a bid for (just) the
A shares can still be triggered, but since we cannot increase sa beyond unity it is no longer
possible to have r pay out all rents. Instead, we are stuck in the corner (s∗
a = 1), where r
merely matches i’s corresponding reservation price:
if zi + (yi − yr) ≤ zr ≤ 2zi + (yi − yr) then s∗
a = 1 ⇒ V A∗
r = yi + zi. (24)
In this case we do have a quasi-1S1V rule: sa = 1 = va would perform equally well as a
two-class/single-bid structure with sa = 1 > va > 1/2 that we consider here.
• zr > 2zi+(yi−yr). Now a double-bid takeover becomes r’s preferred solution. In the value
formula (18), both Max() terms are “in the money” because zi ≥ 0 and, by assumption,
yi > yr. Thus, V AB
r = yr + (yi − yr) + 2zi = yi + 2zi, which does dominate the outcome ofDouble Bids for Dual-Class Shares 13
the single-bid solution, yi + zi.4
if zr > 2zi + (yi − yr) then V AB∗
r = yi + 2zi for any sa. (25)
QED
In the ﬁrst case, no bid is possible under any charter. Case 2 allows the owner to extract
all rent with a dual-class structure and a single-bid take-over rule; with the optimal charter, r
then just breaks even. Only in case 3 the optimal charter is a pseudo-1S1V one: sa = 1 = va
would perform equally well as a two-class/single-bid structure with sa = 1 > va > 1/2 that
we consider here. Case 4, lastly, would mean that a dual-class, double-bid charter is optimal.
Thus, the ﬁnding at this stage is that while in one domain quasi-1S1V does no harm from the
founder’s point of view, in two others it does.
3.2 The rival provides the larger security beneﬁts
In the case yr > yi there is no unique, immediately obvious a priori ranking of the domains of
single- v. double-bid games. It is possible to identify ﬁve relevant types of charters/games, and
ﬁfteen relevant domains for the parameter combinations (y,z). In some domains, there are
two games/charters that provide the same optimal outcome. The optimal dual-class charter
now is a pseudo-1S1V one only if both contenders generate the same social value:
Proposition 4 Under the assumptions of this paper, if yi > yr the optimal cash distribution
rule and the resulting value of the company upon arrival of the bidder are given by Table 2.
For 1S1V to be as good as the best dual-class charter from the founder’s point of view, one
needs equal social value (yr + zr = yi + zi). In all other cases the founder selects a dual-class
charter.
Proof We start with a separate analysis of single- and dual-bid games, and afterwards identify
the relevant domains where each solution is relevant. First assume a charter that allows a single
bid. Equation (9) shows that, with yr > yi, the ﬁrm’s value is now negative in sa, so we would
like to set sa at a lower bound. The lower bound is provided either by the constraint s∗
a ≥ 0
or r’s success condition for single or double bids.
4The ﬁrst one-bid solution, paying out the full reservation value yr + zr, is no longer feasible here: it would
require sa > 1.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 14
• Case a. The corner solution sa = 0 restricts the general no-loss set, (7), to the subset
zi < zr, where r does keep some proﬁt. Thus, in a single-bid game,
if zi ≤ zr then s∗
a = 0 ⇒ V A(a)
r = yr + zi . (26)
Given that, by assumption, the A shares have at least half of the votes, the solution sa = 0
is far from 1S1V.
• Case b. Outside the subset zi < zr, the founder would still like to set sa as low as possible,
but now she is stopped by r’s success condition rather than by the natural zero bound. The
zero-proﬁt solution s∗
a = (zi − zr)/(yr − yi) is possible if it yields values in the range [0,1],
that is, when zr ≤ zi ≤ zr + (yr − yi). Thus, in a single-bid game,




≤ 1 ⇒ V A(b)
r = yr + zr. (27)
Again this is not pseudo-1S1V except in the single special case in the corner, sa = 1
(⇐ zi − zr = yr − yi).
For single-bid contests with yr > yi there is no genuine zone with corner solutions sa = 1,
and therefore no regular quasi-1S1V zone. Indeed, if the founder would set sa = 1, r’s success
condition becomes yr +zr ≥ yi +zi, that is, zi ≤ zr +(yr −yi), but in that domain, as we just
saw, value maximization requires sa to be set as low as possible rather than ﬁxed at unity.
Now consider the double bid. Considering the value formula (18) with its two Max(.)
functions, there are three possible solutions: (c) both of the Max() terms are in the money;
(d) one of them is, and (e) none of them is. We still assume yr > yi. First we note that the
general success condition for double bids, (17), limits the admissible values for zi for all three
cases:
yr + zr ≥ yi + 2zi ⇒ zi ≤
yr − yi + zr
2
. (28)
We now look at each of the three cases:
• Case c. When both of the “Max” terms in the value formula (18) are in the money, (18)
again simpliﬁes to V
AB(c)
r = yi + 2zi. It is easily veriﬁed that, for both Max() functions to
be in the money, sa is necessarily in the interval [1−zi/(yr −yi),zi/(yr −yi)], which is non-
empty only if zi > (yr − yi)/2. This condition, and similar ones derived below, guarantees
feasibility, not optimality. The value of sa has no impact on the value
• Case d. Without loss of generality, assume the ﬁrst Max in the money, the second one out.
These outcomes require, respectively, sa < zi/(yr − yi) — which is always feasible becauseDouble Bids for Dual-Class Shares 15
zi ≥ 0 — and sa < 1−zi/(yr −yi), which is feasible iﬀ 1−zi/(yr −yi) > 0, i.e. zi < yr −yi.
The value-maximizing double-bid charter in this case is sa = 0 (if the ﬁrst Max is positive),
or sa = 1 (if the second Max is positive).5 In either case the value formula (18) reduces to
V
AB(d)
r = yr + zi.
• Case e. When both of the “Max” terms in the value formula (18) are out the money we
have V
AB(e)
r = yr. For both Max() functions to be out the money, sa is necessarily in the
interval [zi/(yr − yi),1 − zi/(yr − yi)], which is non-empty only iﬀ zi < (yr − yi)/2.
Table 2 shows the proper orderings of the various possible intervals for the three possible
orderings of zr relative to yr − yi and (yr − yi)/2. The table indicates which solution is
possible where, what the resulting value is, and which value is dominated by an alternative
charter, from thee founder’s point of view. Speciﬁcally, an empty box means that for the
stated parameter combinations there is no bid possible of that type. A value in small font and
between parentheses indicates that, in that domain, another charter is available that produces
a higher value. QED.
We note that the double-bid contest with premia for both shares, case c, is preferred only
for high values of zr, while the bid with a zero premium over the current security value, case
e with V AB − yi, is not used at all. Case d is potentially more popular but does not add any
value to the single-bid solution a: in terms of shareholder value, buying the B shares at the
post-bid security value sbyr does not bring any gains to the investor relative to leaving these
shares in the market.
3.3 Social value versus IPO value
From the above, under a perfect-foresight the founder would only exceptionally chose a 1S1V
charter. Is this socially recommendable? In this section we compare the social-value criterion,
which we take to be (zr + yr) − (zi + yi), to r’s success condition.
• Under 1S1V, where sa = 1, there is no distinction between r’s condition for success, (7),
and the total value criterion.
5For instance, set sa = 0. This means that A’s pre- and post-takeover value as a claim on cashﬂows is zero.
Thus, r needs to oﬀer no more than zi for the voting rights so as to forestall a counterbid by i for the A shares.
The condition zi < (yr − yi)/2 implies yr > yi + 2zi, implying in turn that the security value of the B-shares
(yr) does exceed i’s reservation value (yi + zi). Thus, r oﬀers the post-bid security value for B, and value-wise
such an oﬀer does not add anything to a single-bid oﬀer for A where the B shares remain outstanding at the
post-bid security value.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 16
Table 2: possible outcomes when yr − yi > 0
case Panel A: when zr > yr − yi > 0
zi :
yr−yi
2 yr − yi
zr+yr−yi
2 zr zr + yr − yi
a V A = yr + zi V A = yr + zi (V A = yr + zi) V A = yr + zi
b V A = yr + zr
c (V AB = yi + 2zi) V AB = yi + 2zi
d V AB = yr + zi V AB = yr + zi
e (V AB = yr)





2 yr − yi zr + yr − yi
a V A = yr + zi V A = yr + zi
b V A = yr + zr V A = yr + zr V A = yr + zr
c (V AB = yi + 2zi) (V AB = yi + 2zi)
d V AB = yr + zi V AB = yr + zi (V AB = yr + zi)
e (V AB = yr)





2 yr − yi zr + yr − yi
a V A = yr + zi
b (V A = yr + zr) (V A = yr + zr) V A = yr + zr V A = yr + zr
c (V AB = yi + 2zi)
d V AB = yr + zi V AB = yr + zi V AB = yr + zi
e (V AB = yr)
Key to Table 2. The table shows the possible outcomes for various voting rules (the lines) and intervals for zi
(the columns) when yr −yi > 0. The entries in the ﬁrst row show the critical zi-values that mark the intervals.
An empty cell means that for the stated parameter combinations there is no bid possible of that type. A value
in small font and between parentheses indicates that, for these parameter values, another charter is available
that produces a higher value. Case a and b are single-bid cases, where the A shares are either pure voting stocks
(case a: sa = 0) or receive the rent-extracting income share (case b: sa = (zi − zr)/(yr − yi)). Cases c − e are
double-bid charters where, respectively, two, one, or none of the “Max” terms in the value formula (18) are in
the money. In case c, any sa in [1 − zi/(yr − yi),zi/(yr − yi)] will do, in case d we need sa = 1 or 0, case e
imposes no restrictions on sa. The required voting rights for each case can be found in Table 1.
• For dual-bid charters the diﬀerence between r’s condition for success, (17), and the total
value criterion is easily identiﬁed as:
r’s success condition: (yr + zr) > (yi − 2zi)
⇔ (zr + yr) − (zi + yi) > zi. (29)
It follows that all takeovers of this type do add value. However, some takeovers that
would have taken place under 1S1V are now impossible, and this is especially a problem
when the incumbent has large private beneﬁts.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 17
• For single-bid games, lastly, we again start from r’s condition for success, (7), and then
rearrange to bring out the diﬀerence with the total-value criterion:
r’s success condition: (sayr + zr) − (sayi + zi) > 0









(yr − yi)(1 − sa)
. (30)
It follows that takeovers that are possible only under a dual-class charter are socially
undesirable. Bad takeovers of this type all have sa < 1 and either zr > zi or yi > yr; and
given that either of these holds, a smaller sa increases the amount of social loss that is
compatible with a private gain. Equally obvious, when zr < zi or yr > yi, some socially
desirable takeovers will not take place, and the lower sa the higher the missed social gain
can be.
The takeover is, notably, value-reducing in case 2 of Proposition 3. Even though, in case
2, the optimal sa forces the rival to pay out the entire value, this is still below the total value
under i’s management (that is, yr + zr < yi + zi). Worse, if yi − yr > zi, this solution may
entail a drop not just in social value but even in post-takeover shareholder value, from yi to
yr +zr; a standard prisoner’s dilemma prevents atomistic shareholders from abstaining, as the
oﬀer is conditional. Here is founder’s interest deviates from the interest of not just society but
even of the shareholders he sells to.
All these results rely on the perfect-forecast condition. When the founder knows only
approximately what the rival’s characteristics are, a tailor-made charter will sink the take-over
when the rival does not meet the critical standards implicit in the charter. We accordingly
proceed to the imperfect-foresight case, Section 4. The numerical results provided in that
section also shed light on how wide the gap between social and private interest may be.
4 Optimal sharing & voting structure under uncertainty
In this section we more realistically view yr and zr as random variables, given the information
available at the time the charter is designed. The values for yi and zi, in contrast, are taken to
be deterministic because the entrepreneur appoints a known party as the initial management







V (yr,zr;sa,va,yi,zi)f(yr,zr)dyrdzr. (31)Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 18
Note that this is not just an expected value of the values derived in the preceding sections.
The previous results, so to speak, allow the founder to quickly revise the charter as soon as
a rival shows up. Here, in contrast, the owners can no longer raise the lower bound if and
when they see that the bidder is exceptionally strong; nor is any softening of the conditions
possible anymore if the rival turns out to be somewhat weaker than expected: now the idea of
bidding would be dropped. So in either case there now is an opportunity loss, relative to the
perfect-foresight case.
Although an analytical solution of Equation (31) under e.g. normal, lognormal or uniform
distributions is not overly diﬃcult, it is tedious and hard to survey, so we prefer to present
numerical results. We choose normal distributions for yr and zr. We normalize yi to unity
and consider expected values for yr that range from relatively weak to strong— 0.9, 1, 1.1
— with standard deviations of 0.3. Our values for the incumbent’s private beneﬁts zi are
set at either 0.05, 0.1 or 0.15. For the rival’s private beneﬁts zr, we choose distributions
with mean values of 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 and 0.25, and a standard deviation of 0.03. The
reason for including distributions with higher means for zr is that especially the interested
rival management teams will be the ones that hope on larger synergy gains, allowing for the
potential extraction of larger private beneﬁts. This gives us in total 3 × 3 × 5 = 45 diﬀerent
combinations of distributions,6 each with its optimal choice of voting structure and its resulting
value of the target ﬁrm. We solve numerically, by discretizing and assigning to each point in
the (yr,zr) grid the corresponding joint normal probability value. For each distribution we
calculate values of about 40,000 grid points. Then we maximize the IPO value of the ﬁrm—
the proceeds to the founder, when the ﬁrm is ﬂoated—by varying/optimizing the proportion
of cash ﬂow rights assigned to each class of securities.
These and related results are presented in Figures 1 to 3. The graphs in Figure 1 are
all characterized by E(yr) < yi, those of Figure 2 by E(yr) = yi, and those of Figure 3 by
E(yr) > yi. The optimized IPO values of the ﬁrm are illustrated in the top rows of each ﬁgure.
In the second row we show the corresponding post take-over y+z values, while the bottom row
displays the corresponding ys. The left-hand-side column of graphs shows results for zi = 0.05,
the middle column for zi = 0.1, and the rightmost column for zi = 0.15. Within each of the
6The issue is of course not to cover all possible distributions, but to allow for various combinations of
characteristics for both the rival and incumbent management teams. We have conducted a sensitivity analysis
by changing standard deviations and extending the range for yr’s, however, the pattern of the results does not
change. We therefore omit these simulations from the discussion.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 19
resulting 15 graphs, the mean zr then varies along the x-axis from 0.05 to 0.25. The graphs
in Figure 4 plot the optimal sa values for the single bid and double bid cases, with the top,
middle and bottom rows corresponding to the graphs in Figure 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
There are obvious general patterns for the optimized IPO values (in the top rows), like
values that increase when we move from Figure 1 to Figure 3 (higher yr) or when we go from
the left column to the right one (higher zi)7, and steeper connecting lines when we move to
the right within each of the graphs (higher zr). Our main interest, however, is the comparison
of the diﬀerent voting structures. The dual-class charter is now always strictly preferred to
a 1S1V structure. Generally, the double-bid dual-class charter seems to do better than the
single-bid one if r oﬀers a higher security value yr, but especially so when relatively more
private beneﬁts (on average) can be extracted by the rival management team. Conversely,
when the incumbent management team is able to extract relatively more private beneﬁts than
its rival team, a single-bid charter seems to do better for a wider range of distributions of r
characteristics. Pure separation of cash ﬂows and voting rights always underperforms. It is
also worthwhile to infer from Figure 4 under what conditions the dual-class single-bid case
closely resembles a de facto 1S1V structure (sa ≈ 1) or pure separation of cash ﬂow and
votes (sa ≈ 0). The optimal setting in a single-bid dual-class structure comes close to a 1S1V
structure when zr is large comparatively to zi but only in those instances where the double-bid
dual-class structure would be strictly preferred by the entrepreneur. Note that also that such
a double-bid dual-class charter becomes somewhat excentric: one class of shares holds just a
few votes, and the other class almost all of them, but still both classes are needed for a bid
to be successful. Only in one of our cases do we ﬁnd that the single-bid dual-class structure
resembles the pure separation of votes and cash ﬂows as in HR (1988); this notably is the case
when the rival is drawn from a distribution with both E(yr) > yi and E(zr) > zi.
Of interest is also what the optimal solution would be from the perspective of a social
planner, and to what extent the entrepreneur’s private choices deviate from the social optimum.
Any serious misalignment will be a source of concern and might trigger additional regulation
of the take-over market, which in turn would limit the set of options for the entrepreneur
and potentially leads to privately sub-optimal investments. An obvious candidate objective
function for the social planner would be to maximize the expected post-take-over total value,
7A higher zi forces r to bid higher, and r is often able to do so because in our experiments zr tends to be
above zi.Double Bids for Dual-Class Shares 20
y + z. The great argument in favor of 1S1V is that this charter will achieve that, as it allows
only for a take-over when yr + zr > yi + zi. We saw that 1S1V was hardly ever part of
the optimal solution for the entrepreneur, so the issue is how signiﬁcant the resulting conﬂict
between private and social interests may be.
The second row of graphs in ﬁgures 1 to 3 plot the social values corresponding to each of
the entrepreneur’s possible charters (optimized wrt the details, if relevant). As before, values
generated by a common charter are linked by line segments. One comforting observation is
that, across charters and disregarding the previously suboptimal pure separation of cash ﬂow
rights and votes, the diﬀerences in social values y + z are nowhere as large as the diﬀerences
in pre-bid market values (the graphs in the top row) or post-bid security values (the graphs in
the bottom row). The source of any deviation between private and social value is, of course,
private beneﬁts. We observe that there seems to be no important link between the level of
the rival’s zr and the size of any social value lost by the entrepreneur’s preferred charter;
apparently, enough of the rival’s private value is creamed oﬀ during the take-over process.
For the incumbent, however, there is no such mechanism. For low values of zi the impact of
the founder’s choice on social value similarly tends to be small or insigniﬁcant, irrespective of
whether the zr’s and yrs are large or not. But the potential amount of social value lost grows
the larger zi, and the eﬀect strengthens for higher yrs.
Of course, all these results depend on the parameters chosen for the simulation, and espe-
cially the levels of the private beneﬁts. We believe that the levels chosen here (up to 15 % for
the incumbent, and 25 % for the rival) are reasonable for large listed companies in Western
economies, but there is no way to prove this. Subject to this caveat we conclude that for low
zi’s, ceteris paribus, the social planner’s optimal y + z seems to be be closely matched by any
charter except for pure separation of cash ﬂows and votes. Only for higher initial zis does the
charter’s impact become noticeable from the social point of view. But, we repeat, the impact
of the charter on social value is far smaller than the impact on post-bid security value or initial
market value.
5 Conclusions
We extend the theoretical framework in Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1989)
by looking extensively at control contests when both the rival and incumbent potentially can
enjoy private perks or realize synergies from being in control of the target ﬁrm. The analysis ofDouble Bids for Dual-Class Shares 21
the game adds interesting new elements to the above seminal papers, and shows that within our
setting 1S1V can rarely be an optimal structure in terms of maximizing the IPO value of the
ﬁrm if the rival’s characteristics are known in advance. 1S1V lacks two useful ingredients: the
ﬂexibility in sharing rules that sometimes leads to complete rent extraction from the bidder,
and the extra premia that sometimes have to be paid when r needs two classes of shares
while, to i, one class is suﬃcient to maintain the status quo. We also allow for the rival’s
characteristics to be stochastic at the time the charter is written, and we numerically solve
for the optimal structure by maximizing expected ﬁrm value across a distribution of possible
rivals. We ﬁnd that 1S1V never comes out as the founder’s ﬁrst choice. However, we also show
that the impact of the charter on social value is less important. Even for high zi, where the
impact is greatest, the eﬀect remains small relative to the impact on IPO value or post-takeover
value. A last contribution of the paper is that we explore the gains from issuing more than
two classes of shares.
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